

# GUARANTEEING TIMED OPACITY USING PARAMETRIC TIMED MODEL CHECKING

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## Context: timing attacks

- Principle: deduce **private information** from timing data (**execution time**)
- Issues:
  - May depend on the **implementation (introduced by the compiler)**
  - A relatively trivial solution: make the program last always its maximum execution time  
Drawback: **loss of efficiency**
- Informal problems
  - Question: can we exhibit **secure execution times**?
  - Further question: can we also tune internal timing constants to make the system resisting to timing attacks?

**Objective.** Given a system modeled by a timed automaton, can we exhibit **secure execution times**, i. e., for which an attacker having only access to the global execution time cannot deduce whether some private location was visited?

## A simple example of a timing attack

```

1 # input pwd : Real password
2 # input attempt: Tentative password
3 for i = 0 to min(len(pwd), len(attempt)) - 1 do
4   if pwd[i] != attempt[i] then
5     return false
6   done
7 return true
    
```


Listing 1: Code describing the verification of a tentative password input by the user

```

pwd      c h i c k e n
attempt  c h e e s e
Execution time  $\epsilon$   $\epsilon$   $\epsilon$ 
    
```

- Problem: The execution time is proportional to the number of consecutive correct characters from the beginning of **attempt**

## Timed Automaton (TA) [AD94]



- Finite state automaton (sets of **locations** and **actions**) augmented with a set  $X$  of **clocks**
  - Real-valued variables evolving linearly **at the same rate**
  - Can be compared to integer constants in invariants and guards
- Features
  - Location **invariant**: property to be verified to stay at a location
  - Transition **guard**: property to be verified to enable a transition
  - Clock **reset**: some of the clocks can be **set to 0** along transitions

## Parametric Timed Automaton (PTA) [AHV93]

- Timed automaton (sets of **locations**, **actions** and **clocks**) augmented with a set  $P$  of **parameters (Unknown constants)** compared to a **clock** in guards and invariants
- High interest of **timing parameters: underspecified systems, or partially known systems**

## Overview of our theoretical results [TOSEM22]

- General case: The mere existence of a parameter valuation for which there exists a duration for which timed-opacity is achieved **is undecidable**
- Study of a subclass known for being “at the frontier” of decidability (L/U-PTA) [Hun+02]
- Practical contribution: We adopt a “best-effort” approach for the general case of PTAs: this approach is not guaranteed to terminate


## Experiments [TOSEM22]

- Verification engine: **IMITATOR** [And21]
- Common PTA benchmarks [TAP21]
- Library of Java programs [STA], manually translated to PTAs
  - user-input variables translated to (non-timing) parameters (supported by **IMITATOR**)

## Timed-opacity definition [TOSEM22]

**Attacker model** The attacker only has **access to the global execution time** from the initial location to some final location (no action is visible)

**Secret** Has the system visited some private location  $\ell_{priv}$ ?




**Definition** (timed opacity) The system is **opaque w.r.t.  $\ell_{priv}$  on the way to  $\ell_f$**  for a **duration  $d$**  if there exist two runs from  $\ell_0$  to  $\ell_f$  of duration  $d$

1. one passing by  $\ell_{priv}$
2. one **not** passing by  $\ell_{priv}$

### Example

- There exist two runs of duration  $d$  for all durations  $d \in [2, 3]$ :



The system is **opaque w.r.t.  $\ell_{priv}$  on the way to  $\ell_f$**  for all **durations** in  $[2, 3]$

- But it is not possible to reach  $\ell_f$  with a path of duration 1.5 not passing by  $\ell_{priv}$
- The system is **not fully opaque w.r.t.  $\ell_{priv}$  on the way to  $\ell_f$**

**Theorem** The durations  $d$  such that the system is opaque can be effectively computed and defined

**Corollary** Asking whether a TA is opaque for all its execution times (“**full timed-opacity**”) is **decidable**

## Perspectives

### Theoretical side

- Some restricted problems remain open e. g., PTAs with one clock

### Practical side

- Automatic translation of programs to PTAs
- Repairing a non-opaque system

## References

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- [TOSEM22] Étienne André, Didier Lime, Dylan Marinho, and Jun Sun. “Guaranteeing Timed Opacity using Parametric Timed Model Checking”. In: *TOSEM* (2022).

This work was partially supported by the ANR-NRF French-Singaporean research program ProMiS (ANR-19-CE25-0015)