

AFADL 2022

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Vannes

Guaranteeing Timed Opacity using Parametric Timed Model Checking

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Context: timing attacks

- ▶ Principle: deduce **private information** from timing data (**execution time**)

Issues:

- ▶ May depend on the **implementation** (or, even worse, be **introduced by the compiler**)
- ▶ A relatively trivial solution: make the program last always its maximum execution time
Drawback: **loss of efficiency**

↪ Non-trivial problem

A simple example of timing attack

```
1 # input pwd      : Real password
2 # input attempt: Tentative password
3 for i = 0 to min(len(pwd), len(attempt)) - 1 do
4     if pwd[i] /= attempt[i] then
5         return false
6 done
7 return true
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pwd	c	h	i	c	k	e	n
-----	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

attempt	c	h	e	e	s	e
---------	---	---	---	---	---	---

Execution time:

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Execution time: $\epsilon + \epsilon + \epsilon$

- ▶ **Problem:** The execution time is proportional to the number of consecutive correct characters from the beginning of attempt

Informal problems

Question: can we exhibit **secure execution times**?

Time-opacity computation

Exhibit **execution times** for which it is not possible to infer information on the internal behavior

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Time-opacity computation

Exhibit **execution times** for which it is not possible to infer information on the internal behavior

Further question: can we also tune internal timing constants to make the system resisting to timing attacks?

Time-opacity synthesis

Exhibit **execution times and internal timing constants** for which it is not possible to infer information on the internal behavior

Outline

Formalism and Computation results


Toward parameter synthesis

Experiments

Perspectives


Timed automaton (TA)

- ▶ Finite state automaton (sets of *locations*)



Timed automaton (TA)


- ▶ Finite state automaton (sets of **locations** and **actions**)



[AD94] Rajeev Alur and David L. Dill. "A theory of timed automata". In: *Theoretical Computer Science* 126.2 (Apr. 1994), pp. 183–235. ISSN: 0304-3975. DOI: 10.1016/0304-3975(94)90010-8

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
- ▶ Finite state automaton (sets of **locations** and **actions**) augmented with a set X of **clocks** [AD94]
 - ▶ Real-valued variables evolving linearly **at the same rate**



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
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- ▶ Features
 - ▶ Location **invariant**: property to be verified to stay at a location




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


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
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 - ▶ Location **invariant**: property to be verified to stay at a location
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 - ▶ Clock **reset**: some of the clocks can be **set to 0** along transitions



The most critical system: The coffee machine




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- ▶ Example of concrete run for the coffee machine
 - ▶ Coffee with 2 doses of sugar


 $x = 0$
 $y = 0$


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


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
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
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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


Formalization

Hypotheses:

[AS19]

- ▶ A start location l_0 and an end location l_f
- ▶ A special private location l_{priv}




Definition (timed opacity)

The system is **opaque** w.r.t. l_{priv} on the way to l_f for a duration d if there exist two runs to l_f of duration d


1. one passing by l_{priv}
2. one *not* passing by l_{priv}

[AS19] Étienne André and Jun Sun. "Parametric Timed Model Checking for Guaranteeing Timed Opacity". In: ATVA (Oct. 28–31, 2019). Ed. by Yu-Fang Chen, Chih-Hong Cheng, and Javier Esparza. Vol. 11781. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Taipei, Taiwan: Springer, 2019, pp. 115–130. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-31784-3_7

Example




Example



- ▶ There exist two runs of duration $d = 2$:


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


We say that the system is **opaque** w.r.t. l_{priv} on the way to l_f for a duration $d = 2$

Example




- ▶ There exist two runs of duration d for all durations $d \in [2, 3]$:



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
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


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
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- ▶ But

There exists a run of duration 1.5 passing by l_{priv}



Example



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
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It is not possible to reach l_f with a path of duration 1.5 not passing by l_{priv}

Example




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- ▶ But

There exists a run of duration 1.5 passing by l_{priv}



It is not possible to reach l_f with a path of duration 1.5 not passing by l_{priv}

We say that the system is **not fully opaque** w.r.t. l_{priv} on the way to l_f

Problem 1: timed-opacity computation

Timed-opacity computation problem

Find durations d (“execution times”) of runs from ℓ_0 to ℓ_f such that the system is opaque w.r.t. ℓ_{priv} on the way to ℓ_f

Theorem The durations d such that the system is opaque can be effectively computed and defined

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Corollary Asking if a TA is opaque for all its execution times is decidable

Proof: based on the region graph and RA-arithmetic (see [TOSEM22])

Exact complexity: unproved (EXPSpace upper bound proved, but exponential hardness seems likely)

[TOSEM22] Étienne André, Didier Lime, Dylan Marinho, and Jun Sun. “Guaranteeing Timed Opacity using Parametric Timed Model Checking”. In: *TOSEM (2022)*. To appear

Outline

Formalism and Computation results


Toward parameter synthesis

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Parametric Timed Automaton (PTA)

- ▶ Timed automaton (sets of locations, actions and clocks)




[AHV93] Rajeev Alur, Thomas A. Henzinger, and Moshe Y. Vardi. "Parametric real-time reasoning". In: *STOC*. ed. by S. Rao Kosaraju, David S. Johnson, and Alok Aggarwal. San Diego, California, United States: ACM, 1993, pp. 592–601. ISBN: 0-89791-591-7. DOI: 10.1145/167088.167242

Parametric Timed Automaton (PTA)

- ▶ Timed automaton (sets of **locations**, **actions** and **clocks**) augmented with a set P of **parameters**
 - ▶ **Unknown constants** compared to a **clock** in guards and invariants

[AHV93]




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 $v(\mathcal{A})$ is the TA where each parameter p is valued by $v(p)$

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$$\text{with } v : \begin{cases} p_1 & \rightarrow 1 \\ p_2 & \rightarrow 5 \\ p_3 & \rightarrow 8 \end{cases}$$

Problem 2: timed-opacity synthesis

Timed-opacity synthesis problem

Find **durations** d (“execution times”) of runs of \mathcal{A} from l_0 to l_f such that the system is opaque w.r.t. l_{priv} on the way to l_f

Problem 2: timed-opacity synthesis

Timed-opacity synthesis problem


Find **parameter valuations** v and **durations** d (“execution times”) of runs of $v(\mathcal{A})$ from l_0 to l_f such that the system is opaque w.r.t. l_{priv} on the way to l_f

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Example:




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Expected result:


$$p_1 \leq 3 \wedge p_2 \leq 3 \wedge d \in [p_2, 3]$$

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Example:



Expected result: $p_1 \leq 3 \wedge p_2 \leq 3 \wedge d \in [p_2, 3]$
If $v(p_1) = 1$ and $v(p_2) = 2$: $\text{T} \wedge \text{T} \wedge d \in [2, 3]$

Overview of our theoretical results

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[TOSEM22]

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 - ▶ The existence of valuations for timed opacity w.r.t. some execution times is decidable
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[TOSEM22]

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[TOSEM22]

We adopt a “best-effort” approach for the general case of PTAs

- ▶ Approach not guaranteed to terminate in theory

[TOSEM22] Étienne André, Didier Lime, Dylan Marinho, and Jun Sun. “Guaranteeing Timed Opacity using Parametric Timed Model Checking”. In: *TOSEM (2022)*. To appear

Outline

Formalism and Computation results

Toward parameter synthesis

Experiments

Perspectives

Experimental environment

Algorithms

1. Timed-opacity: “for a non-parametric TA, is the TA opaque for all execution times?”
2. Timed-opacity synthesis: “for a PTA, synthesize parameter valuations and execution times ensuring timed opacity”

Benchmarks

- ▶ Common PTA benchmarks [TAP21]
- ▶ Library of Java programs <https://github.com/Apogee-Research/STAC/>
 - ▶ Manually translated to PTAs
 - ▶ User-input variables translated to (non-timing) parameters (supported by IMITATOR)

See experiments at doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3251141

and imitator.fr/static/ATVA19/

Experiments: (non-parametric) timed opacity

Model			Transf. PTA			Result	
Name	$ A $	$ X $	$ A $	$ X $	$ P $	Time (s)	Opaque?
Fig. 5, [VNN18]	1	1	2	3	3	0.02	(×)
Fig. 1b, [GMR07]	1	1	2	3	1	0.04	(×)
Fig. 2a, [GMR07]	1	1	2	3	1	0.05	(×)
Fig. 2b, [GMR07]	1	1	2	3	1	0.02	(×)
Web privacy problem [Ben+15]	1	2	2	4	1	0.07	(×)
Coffee	1	2	2	5	1	0.05	✓
Fischer-HSRV02	3	2	6	5	1	5.83	(×)
STAC:1:n			2	3	6	0.12	(×)
STAC:1:v			2	3	6	0.11	×
STAC:3:n			2	3	8	0.72	✓
STAC:3:v			2	3	8	0.74	(×)
STAC:4:n			2	3	8	6.40	×
STAC:4:v			2	3	8	265.52	×
STAC:5:n			2	3	6	0.24	✓
STAC:11A:v			2	3	8	47.77	(×)
STAC:11B:v			2	3	8	59.35	(×)
STAC:12c:v			2	3	8	18.44	×
STAC:12e:n			2	3	8	0.58	×
STAC:12e:v			2	3	8	1.10	(×)
STAC:14:n			2	3	8	22.34	(×)

✓ = not vulnerable; (×) = vulnerable, can be repaired; × = vulnerable, cannot be repaired

Experiments: (parametric) timed-opacity synthesis

Model				Transf. PTA			Result	
Name	$ \mathcal{A} $	$ \mathcal{X} $	$ \mathcal{P} $	$ \mathcal{A} $	$ \mathcal{X} $	$ \mathcal{P} $	Time (s)	Constraint
Fig. 5, [VNN18]	1	1	0	2	3	4	0.02	K
Fig. 1b, [GMR07]	1	1	0	2	3	3	0.03	K
Fig. 2, [GMR07]	1	1	0	2	3	3	0.05	K
Web privacy problem [Ben+15]	1	2	2	2	4	3	0.07	K
Coffee	1	2	3	2	5	4	0.10	T
Fischer-HSRV02	3	2	2	6	5	3	7.53	K
STAC:3:v			2	2	3	9	0.93	K

K = some valuations make the system non-vulnerable;

T = all valuations make the system non-vulnerable

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- ▶ Some restricted problems remain open
e. g., PTA with one clock
- ▶ Study more restrictive sub-classes, with the hope to exhibit a decidable one

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- ▶ Some restricted problems remain open
e. g., PTA with one clock
- ▶ Study more restrictive sub-classes, with the hope to exhibit a decidable one

On the practical side

- ▶ Have an automatic translation of programs to PTAs
→ Some experiments were done, but on Java programs manually translated to PTAs
- ▶ Repairing a non-opaque system
→ Preliminary ideas in [TOSEM22]^a, but not fixed

^a[TOSEM22] Étienne André, Didier Lime, Dylan Marinho, and Jun Sun. "Guaranteeing Timed Opacity using Parametric Timed Model Checking". In: *TOSEM (2022)*. To appear

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